Weaponizing the Right to be Forgotten? The GDPR, the Catholic Church, and the Battle for Ecclesial Memory

In a case that could have sweeping implications across Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is currently deliberating on a matter referred by the Brussels Court of Appeal. At issue is whether the Catholic Church in Belgium, by refusing to erase names from baptismal records, has violated the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) — particularly the so-called “Right to be Forgotten.”

On its face, the case appears to be a technical dispute over data privacy. But beneath the surface lies a much more profound legal and sociological tension: the collision between individual rights in the digital age and the spiritual, historical, and theological identity of religious institutions. This op-ed argues that while the GDPR’s right to erasure is a crucial safeguard in the modern data environment, its weaponization against religious traditions — particularly the Catholic Church — raises significant constitutional and cultural concerns.

Legal Framework: The GDPR and the Right to Erasure

The GDPR, which came into effect in 2018, enshrines one of the most robust privacy regimes in the world. Article 17, known as the “Right to Erasure” or “Right to be Forgotten,” allows individuals to request the deletion of their personal data under specific circumstances.

However, this right is not absolute. Article 17(3) outlines several exceptions, including:

• When data processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation (17(3)(b));
• When data is kept for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research, or statistical purposes (17(3)(d)).

The Catholic Church argues that its baptismal records fall under these exceptions. They are not merely data points, but sacramental records with religious, historical, and theological significance. Erasing such records, the Church contends, would not only compromise its religious autonomy but also undermine the integrity of sacramental theology.

The Weaponization of Privacy Law?

This case forces us to ask: Can the GDPR be used to erase sacraments? If courts compel religious institutions to alter their internal records to comply with secular privacy laws, where do we draw the line between state regulation and ecclesiastical autonomy?

While data protection is vital in safeguarding individuals against surveillance capitalism, the growing trend of invoking the “right to be forgotten” to undo or rewrite personal histories — even religious ones — could amount to the juridification of belief. If baptismal records, maintained solely for religious and archival purposes, are forced to be deleted, what happens to freedom of religion under Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU?

This is no longer simply a matter of compliance — it becomes a matter of conscience and ecclesiology.

Religious Freedom vs. Data Sovereignty

The GDPR applies to any institution — public or private — that processes personal data. But its application to religious sacraments and their records threatens to redefine the boundary between church and state, especially in societies where the two are constitutionally separated.

The Church’s argument is rooted in the doctrine of sacramental theology, which holds that baptism imparts an indelible spiritual character. From a canonical and theological standpoint, a baptized person cannot be “unbaptized”. The records of that baptism, therefore, are not merely clerical but ontological, recording a spiritual event rather than just a social affiliation.

Demanding their deletion because a person now disaffiliates from the Church is akin to asking for the deletion of a birth certificate because one no longer identifies with their nationality. It misunderstands the nature of the record and overextends the scope of data privacy law.

A Socio-Legal Perspective: Secularism, Identity, and Memory

From a sociological jurisprudence standpoint, this dispute illustrates how modern legal systems increasingly encroach upon domains once considered sacred, private, or symbolic. The Right to be Forgotten, born out of noble intentions to protect against digital harm, is now being leveraged as a tool to erase affiliations that are no longer ideologically convenient.

We must ask: What kind of society are we creating if memory — personal, historical, or spiritual — can be redacted at will?

Religious institutions, like the Catholic Church, are not merely data controllers — they are repositories of memory, identity, and belief. Their records often outlive states, ideologies, and regimes. Weaponizing GDPR against them risks establishing a legal precedent where subjective disaffiliation can override communal memory.

Balancing Competing Rights: Toward a Proportionate Solution

This is not a call to exempt churches entirely from privacy laws. Rather, it is a call for proportionality and legal nuance.

The CJEU should:

• Recognize the archival, religious, and historical nature of sacramental records;
• Allow individuals to annotate their disaffiliation (e.g., marginal notes or formal declarations of apostasy) without requiring deletion;
• Ensure that religious institutions can maintain their internal theological integrity while respecting privacy principles.

Such an approach balances individual rights with religious autonomy, ensuring that one does not annihilate the other.

In Conclusion…

The Court’s decision will set a powerful precedent — not only in data protection law but in defining the limits of secular power over religious life. While the GDPR is a cornerstone of modern human rights in the digital era, it must not become a blunt instrument used to erase the sacred under the guise of privacy.

To forget responsibly is a right. But to weaponize forgetting against memory — particularly sacramental memory — is a grave misstep in law and justice.

About the Author:

Atty. Emmanuel S. Caliwan is a Secular Franciscan, lawyer, and sociologist whose work focuses on the intersection of law, religion, and social transformation. He has been a practicing Data Protection Professional/Officer since 2017 and has written on data protection, religious freedom, and the sociology of constitutional law.